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We should really like to know, at the end of study, the probability that
we have found a linkage, as pointed out by Cedric Smith (1959) 135 years
ago. (Elston 1997)
Bayes’ Theorem has the advantage that, unlike any other method of
statistical inference, it gives the answer directly as a probability.)This
probability has a direct meaning, and does not need to be hedged about with
qualifications, unlike a significance level. (Smith 1959)
Bayesianism permits us to measure directly the proba-
bility that we have found a linkage, or what is called
the posterior probability of linkage (PPL). No other sta-
tistical paradigm does this. Smith advocated a Bayesian
approach to linkage analysis as early as 1959, but the
approach seems never to have gained general popularity
(but see, e.g., Hauser and Boehnke 1993; Thomas et al.
1997). If what we really want to know is the PPL, and
if there exists a statistical method for measuring the PPL,
then why is the method not more widely applied? Is there
some reason that we cannot get what we really want?
The Bayesian Paradigm and Bayes’s Theorem
The Bayesian school of statistical inference is generally
associated with two contentious notions: first, that prob-
ability is a measure of degree of belief (rather than, e.g.,
the more common notion that probability is a measure
of long-run frequency); and, second, that the business
of statistical inference is the orderly ranking of beliefs
along a correspondingly subjective probability scale
(rather than, say, the measurement of evidence based on
data). (For the Bayesian perspective, see, e.g., Edwards
et al. [1963]; for two other paradigms in statistical ge-
netics, also see Vieland and Hodge [1998].) But, as Smith
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(1959) pointed out, the only truly Bayesian tool needed
for calculation of the PPL is Bayes’s theorem,which itself
is not contentious at all.
In its most familiar form, Bayes’s theorem states sim-
ply that, for a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
outcomes A1,)An and for any other outcome B,
P(A dB)  P(B dA )P(A )/ P(B dA )P(A )i i i j j
j1..n
 P(B dA )P(A )/P(B) . (1)i i
As a tool for calculation of conditional probabilities
for events, the theorem, which follows from the first
principles of probability theory, is unimpeachable. (I
have given the theorem in the form most useful to my
argument here, following, e.g., Feller [1968, p. 124]; but
see also Hacking [1965] and Stuart and Ord [1987] for
historical accounts of the postulate.)
If we define probability as a long-run frequency of
occurrence, then only things that can occur (events) can
have probability. On the other hand, if we define prob-
abilities as degrees of belief, then propositions (hypoth-
eses) become the sorts of things that have probability.
Thus, in spite of the fact that not all hypotheses can be
said to “occur” in anything but a metaphoric sense, a
Bayesian has no problem interpreting equation (1) in
those cases in which B represents some set of data, Ai
is a hypothesis and the P(Aj)’s represent the prior prob-
ability distribution associated with the space of all pos-
sible hypotheses (“prior” in the sense of holding before
looking at the data).
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A simple example will illustrate why this might be
problematic. Let p be the parameter of a binomial dis-
tribution (the probability, say, that a coin lands heads),
and let the hypothesis be . A Bayesian has no1H:p  8
particular difficulty in assigning a prior probability to
H, because this can be done with reference to a state of
mind. For instance, if I believe that most coins are “fair,”
then I may assign a relatively small prior probability to
H. Generalizing to the probability distribution of the set
of all possible values of p, I might argue that, even before
the coin is tossed, a higher probability should be assigned
to values near than to values farther away; but you12
might feel that, because you have no prior basis for
preferring one value of p over another, the prior distri-
bution should assign equal probability to all possible
values.
For a Bayesian, this poses no problem, and we are
each free to choose whichever prior-probability distri-
bution better suits us. One consequence of adopting the
Bayesian perspective, then, is that reasonable people can
apply Bayes’s theorem to the same data and, depending
on their preferences regarding the priors, arrive at very
different posterior probabilities for the hypothesis of in-
terest, Ai (“posterior” in the sense of holding after look-
ing at the data). This is often taken as invalidating Bay-
esianism in scientific applications (e.g., see Hacking
1965; Royall 1997). But this “subjective” property of
the posterior probability is not a consequence of Bayes’s
theorem per se; it is a consequence of the nature of the
hypothesis to which Bayes’s theorem has been applied.
Suppose, by contrast, that the prior-probability dis-
tribution corresponds to a “chance set-up” (Edwards
1972, p. 50), in which each possible outcome occurs
with some specific probability. For example, suppose
that a lottery is conducted by first rolling a die, then
picking one of six urns in accordance with what the die
shows, and then drawing a ticket from the chosen urn.
If the six urns give six different probabilities that our
ticket matches the ticket drawn, then we would not hes-
itate to calculate the probability of winning as the
weighted average of a winning ticket taken over the six
urns, using as the weights the prior probabilities of each
urn, in this example in each case; and we would have16
no difficulty in applying Bayes’s theorem to obtain the
posterior probability that the observed ticket had been
drawn from any particular urn. Moreover, all of us,
given the set-up (and barring computational errors),
would arrive at the same number for this posterior
probability.
Genetic segregation is a chance set-up, in the sense
that there is a physical placement of genetic material
along chromosomes, a set of stochastic laws governing
meiotic processes, and, therefore, a true probability dis-
tribution for the set of all possible outcomes of any given
meiotic event. The hypothesis of linkage represents a
subset of such outcomes and is therefore readily inter-
pretable as the kind of thing that has probability, quite
without appealing to subjective considerations. We al-
ready make liberal use of other prior-probability distri-
butions in linkage analysis, with similar justification. For
instance, offspring probabilities are regularly calculated
by averaging across all possible mating types, weighting
the average by the prior probabilities (or population fre-
quencies) of the mating types, where the prior-proba-
bility distribution of mating types is governed by a set
of parameters—namely, the allele frequencies.
Of course, the posterior-probability distribution in the
offspring depends on the prior gene frequencies, and
there may be disagreements as to the best way tomeasure
these, so that reasonable people could disagree as to
which particular values should be used. But this is not
to say that all choices for the gene frequencies are equally
valid: the selection of the prior probabilities themselves
is subject, in this case, to empirical verification. Indeed,
I have never heard this used as an argument against
stipulating the gene frequencies. In the case of genetic
transmission, we may not know exactly what the chance
set-up is—unlike the situation in the urn example—but
we are on equal conceptual footing when we make use
of the prior distribution of the recombination fraction
v in linkage analysis as we are when we appeal to the
prior distribution of the urns in the lottery example.
Bayes’s theorem becomes a tool for calculation of the
posterior probability of any hypothesis only if we sub-
scribe to the subjectivist view of things; but, as a tool
for calculation of the posterior probability for hypoth-
eses that refer to specific outcomes of chance set-ups, it
does not require the subjectivist perspective—or entail
the subjectivist consequences. The prior distribution of
v is a wholly empirical matter, just as is the prior dis-
tribution of mating types. Indeed, geneticists do talk un-
inhibitedly about “the probability of [the hypothesis of]
linkage”—and not because we are all Bayesians.
Thus, there is no principled reason why we cannot
calculate what we really want, the PPL. Of course, there
is still the very real practical question of how the priors
should be specified. But before I return to that question
in detail, it will be helpful to first take a closer look at
the PPL itself—to see just what it is; how it differs from
some other, more familiar quantities; and to consider the
implications of the PPL for establishing, and especially
replicating, linkage for complex disorders.
What the PPL Is
The fundamental Bayesian operation applied to link-
age analysis is really very simple in spirit. We start with
a prior-probability distribution for v, f(v) and then, by
considering the data D, we transform the prior distri-
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bution into a posterior distribution f(vFD) of v, given
the data, as in
f(DFv)f(v) f(DFv)f(v)
f(vFD)D  , (2)
f(D)f(DFv)f(v) dv∫
vXvX1/2
which is simply the analogue, in the continuous case, of
the discrete form of Bayes’s theorem, given above. (I will
assume throughout that we are evaluating the evidence
for linkage between a putative trait locus and onemarker
at a time.)
Equation (2) can, in turn, be used to calculate what
we really want to know, the PPL. Let HL represent the
hypothesis that a trait locus and a given marker are
linked, and let H be the hypothesis that they are un-—L
linked, so that . Then the PPL is—P(H )  [1 P (H )]L L
simply the definite integral of equation (2):




 dv . (3) [ ]f(DFv)f(v) dv∫
0XvX1/2!0Xv 1/2
Note that the prior is assumed to be continuous onf(v)
the interval , but with positive mass over the10 X v ! 2
point , so that . An alternative form will1 —v  P(H ) 1 0L2
be important later:
PPL D P(H FD)  [f(DFH )P(H )]/L L L
— —[f(DFH )P(H ) f(DFH )P(H )]L L L L
 f(DFv,H )f(vFH ) dv / L L[ ]
f(DFv,H )f(vFH ) dv L L[
— — f(DFv,H )f(vFH ) dv . (4) L L ]
The particular function of the data, , can takef(DFv)
any number of forms, but, in general, we can sub-
stitute the antilog of the usual LOD score. It hap-
pens that 1LOD(v)D log [P(M,TFv)/P(M,TFv  )]∝10 2
P(MFT,v) for marker data M and trait data T (Cler-log10
get-Darpoux et al. 1986; Elston 1989). Moreover, al-
though I have written equation (2) in terms of the prob-
ability f(DFv), the equation is really based on the
underlying likelihood , where k is anL(v) D k # f(DFv)
arbitrary constant absorbing all functions of the data
that do not involve v (combinatorial terms, etc.). Because
k is constant for all values of v, it cancels out of the
equation. Thus, provided that we are interested in con-
ditioning on all the trait data, as is generally done (Ewens
and Shute 1986; Hodge and Elston 1994; Vieland and
Hodge 1996), any linkage-analysis program set up to
calculate LOD scores can be used to calculate equation
(2). Below, I return to the specification of the prior f(v).
Equations (2) and (3) provide a simple and elegant
method for updating the PPL as we accumulate new
data. Suppose that we have two sets of data, andD1
, and that we have calculated the posterior distribu-D2
tion on the basis of the first set of data alone. WeD1
can then substitute this posterior distribution f(vFD1) in
place of the prior distribution f(v) in equation (2), replace
the data D1 by new data D2, and recalculate equation
(2), which results in a new posterior distribution:
f(vFD2). We can then reapply equation (3), integrating
over f(vFD2), in order to calculate a new, updated PPL.
This procedure for updating the posterior distribution
of v and the PPL can be applied repeatedly, allowing us
to accumulate linkage evidence across as many sets of
data as we like. At each step of the way, we get what
we want: a measure of the PPL itself, based on the total
available evidence—that is, carrying over information
regarding the distribution of v, obtained on the basis of
earlier data, toward the measurement of the evidence
based on new data. This seems wholly in keeping with
the spirit of scientific inquiry, for we would not usually
require that investigators return to a complete state of
ignorance between experiments; rather, we would like
to be able to carry forward what we have learned from
one experiment when we interpret the results of the next
one.
The PPL and the Likelihood Ratio (LR)
In understanding what equations (3) and (4) are, it
may be helpful to contrast themwith a couple of familiar
things that they are not. For instance, the antilog of the
LOD score is an LR, which we can write, in a general
form, as . As is well known, an LR is1P(DFv)/P(DFv  )2
a measure of the relative probabilities of the data, given
the two hypotheses, but is not a measure of the prob-
ability ratio of the hypotheses themselves (e.g., see Elston
1994). It can, however, be transformed into such a prob-
ability ratio, according to Bayes’s theorem, via multi-
plication by the corresponding ratio of prior probabil-
ities. This yields an alternative formulation of Bayes’s
theorem: “the posterior odds)is equal to the product
of the prior odds and the likelihood ratio” (Stuart and
Ord 1987 pp. 280–281; also see, e.g., Edwards 1972;
Elston 1994).
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We can also obtain posterior odds for linkage by di-
viding equation (4) by the corresponding equation for
, which gives—P(H FD)L
P(H FD) f(DFH ) P(H )L L L # . (5)
— — —P(H FD) f(DFH ) P(H )L L L
This suggests an equivalence between ,—f(DFH )/f(DFH )L L
as it appears in equation (5), and the LR,
. But the two are, in fact, distinct.1P(DFv)/P(DFv  )2
An LR can only be used to compare “simple versus
simple” hypotheses; in other words, it can only be eval-
uated for two specific values of v at a time. This is pre-
cisely because the LR is calculated without reference to
the prior distribution f(v). We know—at least in prin-
ciple—how to calculate the probability distribution of
D for any particular value of v, but what is ?1P(DFv ! )2
To calculate , we need to average the proba-1P(DFv ! )2
bilities, for each particular value of v, over the range
, weighting the average by the prior probabilities1v ! 2
. Without the prior probabilities, we cannot cal-1f(vFv ! )2
culate this average and must therefore be satisfied to
consider only one particular value of v at a time.
The expression f(DFHL) in the numerator of equation
(5) is shorthand for the full weighted average,
f(DFv,HL)f(vFHL) dv, as in equation (4); but the ex-∫
pression P(DFv) in the numerator of the LR represents
the probability of D at one particular value of v. (Be-
cause, under , v can take only the value , the cor-1—HL 2
responding denominators are the same.) This is a major
strength of the LR in the many contexts in which we
cannot or will not (for philosophical reasons) ascribe
probability distributions to our parameters: precisely be-
cause the LR does not involve the prior distributions, in
the absence of reasonable priors the LR can still be used
as a measure of statistical evidence (Edwards 1972; Roy-
all 1997). When we are able to specify the prior-prob-
ability distribution, however, the LR is inherently waste-
ful of information regarding its shape.
When it comes to picking the single value of v to use
in the numerator of the LR, a rich and elegant body of
statistical theory, which owes its foundations in large
measure to R. A. Fisher, instructs us to be particularly
interested in that value that maximizes the like-ˆv  v
lihood (i.e., the maximum-likelihood estimator), since it
is this value that gives us the “best” evidence against the
null hypothesis of no linkage. This is a perfectly satis-
fying approach so far as the LR itself goes (e.g., see
Edwards 1972; Royall 1997), but we cannot then use
the LR calculated at this one point, , to derive theˆv  v
posterior odds for linkage per se; rather, we can arrive
only at the posterior odds for —namely,ˆv  v
. If we1 1ˆ ˆ[P(DFv  v)/P(DFv  )] # [P(v  v)/P(v  )]2 2
wanted, we could, of course, multiply the LR evaluated
at by the prior odds for linkage, but note that theˆv  v
resulting quantity would always be greater than the true
posterior odds for linkage.
The PPL and the Posterior Type I Error Rate
Another familiar quantity, which sometimes goes by
the same name as the PPL, is the probability of linkage
given that we have rejected the null hypothesis of no
linkage. It was this latter quantity to which Morton ap-
pealed when he originally recommended a significance
criterion of LOD x 3 (Morton 1955). Using this cri-
terion was meant to ensure (under certain conditions)
that the probability that there really is linkage, given
that we have observed a LOD x3, would be 195% (also
seeMorton 1998). There is nothing wrongwith referring
to this as a “posterior probability of linkage,” but it is
distinct from the PPL as defined above.
Morton was interested in a conventional statistical test
of the hypothesis of linkage versus the hypothesis of no
linkage, such that, whenever the LOD score exceeds
some predetermined cutoff, we decide in favor of link-
age. The test is characterized in terms of the probabilities
of two types of errors that we might incur in making a
decision: (a) the type I error probability a, or the prob-
ability that we reject the hypothesis of no linkage when
it is true; and (b) the type II error probability b that we
fail to reject the hypothesis of no linkage when it is false.
Then, if we know the prior probability of linkage, P(HL),
we can calculate the probability that there really is link-
age associated with any given choice of the significance
cutoff. For example, using a LOD cutoff of 3 for our
significance test and applying Bayes’s theorem, we
calculate
P(H FLOD x 3)L
 [P(LOD x 3FH )P(H )]/L L
[P(LOD x 3FH )P(H )L L
— —( )P(LOD x 3FH )P H ]L L
— [(1 b)P(H )]/[(1 b)P(H ) aP(H )] .L L L
(6)
Although, in some sense, equation (6) also represents
a kind of posterior probability of linkage, it is not at all
the same thing as the PPL. Equation (6) is a function of
the predictive error rates of a particular decision-making
procedure—namely, the rule telling us to reject the hy-
pothesis of no linkage whenever the LOD score is ≥3.
But the rule that we choose to employ in making such
a decision surely has no bearing whatsoever on the actual
probability that the chosen marker is linked to the dis-
ease. Accordingly, equation (6) is more aptly called “one
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minus the posterior type I error rate of the test proce-
dure” (as Morton did indeed call it). In statistics, this
quantity is called the “reliability” of the test (Stuart and
Ord 1987; Morton 1998); but, because that word has
a different connotation in epidemiology, and to under-
score that it is also a posterior measure, calculated after
looking at the data, hereafter I will call it the “posterior
reliability” (PR).
In equation (3) we calculate the probability of linkage
conditional on the data D, whereas in equation (6) we
calculate the probability of linkage conditional on hav-
ing made a particular decision—namely, to reject the
hypothesis of no linkage on the basis of the observed
value of some statistic (not the PPL). This decision is,
of course, related to the data, but only indirectly (e.g.,
see Hacking 1965; Edwards 1972; Royall 1997; Vieland
and Hodge 1998). Why is it, after all, that Morton re-
quired a PR 195%? We are accustomed to accepting a
type I error rate of 5% for many statistical tests, so it
seems reasonable to adopt this level of significance with
respect to the posterior type I error rate of the test as
well. But, really, we should be interested in much smaller
values of the PPL. Would you leave your umbrella at
home because the probability of rain was only 45%?
Replication of Linkage and the PPL
I have mentioned above that equations (2) and (3)
could be used to accumulate linkage evidence across data
sets, but to use them in this way has important impli-
cations for how we decide when a linkage finding has
been replicated. It is widely accepted that, to establish
genetic linkage, any initial finding must be followed by
replication in an independent set of data, and recent
articles have reiterated the importance of maintaining
stringent significance criteria in both initial and follow-
up studies. For instance, Lander and Kruglyak (1995)
recommend requiring an initial finding at a significance
level of (for general pedigrees), followed5∼ 4.9 # 10
by replication at a significance level of in3∼ 1.7 # 10
an independent set of data. In addition, they and others
(Elston 1994; Morton 1998) have stressed the need to
maintain high power to detect linkage at both the initial
and the follow-up stages.
The reason for both the stringency of the significance
levels and the requirement of high power is that even a
small P value can correspond to an unacceptably low
PR, under certain circumstances (Smith and Sturt 1976;
Ge´nin et al. 1995; Morton 1998). For example, if the
prior P(H ) is small, significance criteria need to be cal-L
ibrated appropriately, in order to maintain an acceptable
PR (Morton 1955). Complications such as multiple test-
ing also may require that significance levels be suffi-
ciently stringent to maintain the PR while compensating
for genomewide type I error probabilities (Lander and
Kruglyak 1995).
Similarly, as equation (6) shows, the PR is a function
of both the type I and type II error rates of the testing
procedure, so that, when the latter is large relative to
the former, the PR can be low even for small P values
(Stuart and Ord 1987; Elston 1994; Lander and Krug-
lyak 1995; Morton 1998). In this case, significance levels
again need to be adjusted downward, in order to main-
tain a high PR. This problem is exacerbated by the fact
that, although the power of a genomic screen to detect
linkage to any one locus in a complex system may be
only moderate to begin with, power to replicate at one
particular locus in a replication study will almost cer-
tainly be worse (Suarez et al. 1994).Moreover, in linkage
studies we cannot control or even accurately measure
the power, because it depends on the underlying genetic
model for the trait. Thus, it is really not possible to
calculate the PR on the basis the P value at all.
These are the sorts of considerations to which Smith
(1959, p. 301) was referring (in the passage that I have
used as the second epigraph of the present article) when
he said that significance levels needed to be “hedged
about with qualifications” (also see Elston 1994). The
P value is only reliable as a measure of posterior prob-
ability insofar as we control the type I and type II error
rates of the test procedure on the basis of which it is
calculated. That is to say that the need to control the
error rates of our statistical procedures arises entirely
from the simple fact that we are not directly measuring
the PPL: controlling the error rates is our only line of
defense against those unmeasured forces that cause a
given P value to correspond to a range of possibilities
for the PPL. If there were a one-to-one correspondence
between P values and the PPL to begin with—if a P
value of, say, .001 meant that the PPL was, for instance,
75%—then there would be no need to worry about sig-
nificance levels; indeed, there would be no reason to
perform significance tests to begin with!
Accepting a linkage finding based on only weakly sig-
nificant P values in each of a few separate data sets
carries an unacceptably low PR, but using the data sets
in concert to measure the overall evidence for linkage in
the form of the PPL carries no such danger. The point
is not that a Bayesian analysis would yield more evidence
for linkage across disparate data sets but, rather, that
the only sure way to control the possibilities of misin-
terpreting the evidence with respect to the PPL, if indeed
that is what we really wish to do, is to measure the PPL
itself.
Bayesian analysis allows us to interpret the accumu-
lated weight of the evidence for (or against) linkage, even
when it is accumulated across multiple sets of data, each
one only moderately informative on its own. The tra-
ditional requirement of independent replication would
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appear to preclude the possibility that conclusive evi-
dence can be obtained on the basis of evidence that ac-
cumulates in small increments, but perhaps, in studying
complex disorders, we need to rethink this requirement.
Of course there is another reason entirely that we require
independent replication of any scientific finding—and
that has to do with reproducibility of laboratory results.
This is not a statistical issue, and extrastatisticalmethods
(e.g., cross-typing of DNA at two independent labora-
tories or independent validation of diagnoses) are needed
for this purpose.
But What about the Priors?
Of course, I have left the key difficulty for last: how
do we specify the prior distributions? I think that the
burden of assuming a particular form for f(v) is less than
might be supposed, but the argument here hinges on
understanding exactly how the PPL is calculated, which
is why I have left this topic for last. As equation (4)
makes clear, there are really two separate decisions to
be made: (a) what is the prior-probability distribution
of v, given that there is linkage; and (b) what is the prior
probability of linkage? (The distribution of v under
H is simply 1 for and is 0 elsewhere).1— v L 2
The choice of a form for (a), , will depend1f(vFv ! )2
on experimental design. For example, when linkage to
a particular candidate gene (and not just to what is some-
times called a “candidate locus,” or a marker with prior
evidence of linkage) is being tested, is given1f(vFv ! )2
entirely by the genetic distance between the gene and
the marker: if the marker is 1 cM away, then f(vFv !
for and elsewhere. On the1 1)  1 v  .01 f(vFv ! )  02 2
other hand, if the study design calls for a genomic screen,
then, under the assumption of linkage and at the marker
closest to the trait locus, the appropriate distribution is
the distribution of the distance between a random (trait)
locus and its nearest marker, along a fixed marker map.
(For calculation of a related distribution, see Elston and
Lange 1975.) Specification of this distribution is straight-
forward, on the basis of the assumption of a uniform
distribution for v across the human genome, which ap-
pears reasonable on the basis of experimental results
(Morton 1998). Existing approximations can be refined
by taking into account, for instance, separate male and
female recombination distances in those genomic regions
where these vary substantially.
The critical point is that depends only on1f(vFv ! )2
the density of the marker map, not on the genetic model
for the trait: this distribution relates the location of one
particular marker to one particular trait locus at a time
(on the assumption that two or more trait loci do not
share a closest marker) and is therefore independent of
the total number of trait loci that exist. The specification
of this portion of the prior distribution simply models
the distance between pairs of loci, in the initial “chance
set-up,” in accordance with the underlying laws of ge-
netic inheritance. Of course, we might still end up mis-
specifying this prior. As in any statistical analysis, it is
important to evaluate the dependence of our results on
the particular modeling assumptions used, and mea-
surement of the PPL should be evaluated with respect
to robustness to choice of the priors.
The choice of a form for (b), the prior probability of
linkage between any given marker and a trait locus,
might seem, at first glance, to be more problematic. This
is the part of the distribution that does depend on the
total number of underlying trait loci, since the more such
loci there are, the greater the prior probability of linkage
between the marker and at least one of the trait genes.
Since the true number of trait genes cannot be known
in advance, it is often said that we cannot specify the
prior probability of linkage for a complex disorder. But
notice that the smallest prior probability of linkage, un-
der the assumption that there is at least one trait gene,
occurs when there is exactly one trait gene. This means
that assuming the existence of only one trait gene is
equivalent to minimizing the prior probability of link-
age—that is, maximizing the prior probability of no link-
age P(H ). As equation (4) shows, the PPL depends on—L
the relative magnitude of P(H ) with respect to the total—L
posterior-probability distribution of v; and larger values
for P(H ) in the denominator reduce the magnitude of—L
the total ratio. Thus, by assuming that there is exactly
one trait gene, we arrive at a conservative way to cal-
culate the PPL: in the presence of multiple genes, the
true PPL will always be larger—all other things being
equal—than the calculated value.
Again, the particular value of P(H ) will depend in—L
part on study design. For instance, it will depend on the
lengths of specific chromosomes or regions being tested
(e.g., see Ge´nin et al. 1995), differing, for example, when
all chromosomes are considered or when only the au-
tosomes are considered. In experimental organisms we
can calculate this quantity directly from breeding data,
whereas in humans P(H ) may involve some approxi-—L
mation. Various calculations for the probability that two
loci are syntenic suggest a number in the narrow range
.051–.054 (Morton 1998); under the assumption that
linkage is detectable at X40 cM, Elston and Lange
(1975) calculated that the prior probability of linkage
for two random loci is ∼2%. It is possible that this num-
ber can be improved on in certain contexts, but, in most
applications, small adjustments are unlikely to have
large effects on the PPL. Again, this assumption can be
tested.
Thus, once we look in detail at how equation (4) is
put together, we see that to be Bayesian in this context
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is not such an onerous undertaking: the necessary prior
distributions can be established on sound empirical
grounds, without the need to appeal to “subjective” con-
siderations; and, what is more, they can be appropriately
specified in the absence of information regarding the
genetic model for the trait.
There is, of course, another very serious objection to
the use of equation (2) in the study of complex disor-
ders—namely, that “to arrive at a posterior probability
of linkage, we must)assume prior probabilities for all
the various possible modes of inheritance” (Elston 1994,
p. 10). This criticism goes to the very heart of any like-
lihood-based analysis—not just a Bayesian one: if we do
not know the true, underlying genetic model, then we
cannot write the likelihood in its correct form. Whether
this objection will pose a serious obstacle to Bayesian
applications of the sort that I have described remains to
be put to rigorous testing. I suspect—and preliminary
data confirm (author’s unpublished data)—thatmisspec-
ification of the likelihood will be no more deleterious in
Bayesian applications than in the calculation of LOD
scores themselves. Greenberg et al. (1998a) and others
have shown that, for LOD scores, accurate specification
of the trait model is not essential (also see Greenberg et
al. 1996, 1998b).
Of course, we will never be certain, in any given ap-
plication, that our calculation of the PPL has not been
influenced by misspecification of the model, although
this possibility can be explored by changing the model
and seeing what happens to the PPL. But what is our
alternative? Many would argue that the only acceptable
alternative, when the genetic model is unknown, is to
restrict ourselves to the so-called model-free methods
(see Schaid 1998 [in this issue]), whose validity is in-
dependent of the true mode of inheritance. This means
that we must restrict our outcome measures to P values.
I find the underlying logic of this argument peculiar.
What we really want to measure is the PPL, and the P
value does not measure it. In this case, isn’t restricting
ourselves to the calculation of P values, simply because
they are amenable to exact calculation, a bit like looking
for our lost keys under a lamppost, just because that is
where the light happens to be? Do you prefer to
get—exactly—what you don’t want, or would you
rather have approximately what you really do want?
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